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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL B. MCCORVEY, : 
Plaintiff and : 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
: 
STATE OF UTAH. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION: and LeGRAND : 
JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, t 
Defendants and * 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
OPENING BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is a cross-appeal and appeal1 from the denial of a motion 
for new trial and from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff/Appellant 
Daniel B. McCorvey entered upon a $5.4 million jury verdict in a 
personal injury action. Original appellate jurisdiction is 
conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j) (Supp. 1991) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1991). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to 
establish that the omissions from UDOT's traffic control plan were 
*The parties have stipulated to a consolidated briefing 
schedule in which the Utah Department of Transportation, although 
technically the cross-appellant, agreed to file the opening brief. 
Another cross-appeal filed by the codefendant, LeGrand Construction 
Company, was dismissed in this Court's August 5, 1991 order, based 
on the agreement of McCorvey and LeGrand Construction Company. 
Case No. 910054 
Priority No. 16 
a substantial cause of injury incurred by McCorvey when he lost 
control of his car on a newly resurfaced highway lane, even if they 
were a cause-in-fact? Is the intervening conduct of either the 
contractor, who left excess gravel chips in that lane, or of 
McCorvey and another driver, who engaged in a high speed road race 
through the lane resurfacing zone, a superseding cause of injury to 
McCorvey as a matter of law? 
2. Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the jury's 
special verdict finding McCorvey negligent, is it legally 
insufficient to support the jury's finding that UDOT, in adopting 
a traffic control plan that did not make this side-by-side road 
race physically impossible, was more at fault than McCorvey, who 
raced through a highway resurfacing zone and illegally tried to 
pass another at speeds in excess of posted limits and too fast for 
known and apparent hazardous conditions? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying UDOT 
a new trial after giving a "sudden peril" instruction that is 
improper and prejudicial in Utah's comparative fault system since 
it unfairly comments on the evidence, implies that normal 
negligence principles do not apply to plaintiff, and tends to 
excuse his negligence or culpability in the eyes of a jury? In any 
event, was it prejudicial error to give the "sudden peril" 
instruction in this case because there was no evidence of any 
sudden emergency not caused by McCorvey himself? 
2 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Jury verdicts are upheld on appeal if there is any 
substantial, competent evidence upon which a jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could make the challenged factual finding. Reeves v. 
Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 114 (Utah 1991). In making this 
determination, the appellate court views the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1991); Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. 
Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). With regard to UDOT's 
insufficiency claims in Points I and II, the appellate court must 
consider whether the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of 
a finding that UDOT's negligence was not a proximate cause of harm 
to McCorvey or that UDOT was less at fault than McCorvey that 
reasonable people would not differ on the question. See Cambelt, 
745 P.2d at 1242; Reeves, 813 P.2d at 114 (no substantial evidence 
if finding is so plainly unreasonable that no jury acting fairly 
and reasonably could make it). Finally, this court can reverse the 
trial court's denial of the motion for new trial, based on 
prejudicial error resulting from the sudden peril jury instruction, 
if the denial constituted an abuse of discretion, i.e., if there 
was no reasonable basis for the denial, or if the denial was based 
on erroneous legal principles or findings without record support. 
Crooks ton v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 & n.19 (Utah 
1991). 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Introduction 
This personal injury action arises from a one-car rollover on 
1-15 just south of the 1-70 Cove Fort interchange in Millard 
County, Utah, that occurred in the late afternoon of August 7, 
1986. Thirty-year-old Daniel B. McCorvey was driving his new 1986 
Honda CRX on a southbound stretch of divided highway that was being 
resurfaced with gravel chips by defendant LeGrand Construction 
Company ("LeGrand") under contract with defendant Utah Department 
of Transportation ("UDOT"). McCorvey, travelling 60-65 mph (R. 
3007 at 77; R. 3002 at 55, 61) in a lane resurfaced twq days before 
by the project's contractor (Ex. 20; R. 2998 at 30), lost control 
of the five-speed sports car in a patch of thick gravel and veered 
off the left shoulder of the inside southbound lane into the grassy 
median (R. 3003 at 84). Just before his car left the road, 
McCorvey had accelerated and pulled ahead to pass a van driven by 
Paul Wayne Wright (R. 3003 at 102; R. 3007 at 143, 154), 
The Wright van had come up behind McCorvey at 65-75 mph, then 
tried to jockey ahead of him by passing in the more recently 
resurfaced, unswept, right hand lane of traffic, throwing up loose 
gravel (R. 3004 at 6-10, 36-39; R. 3003 at 105). McCorvey's car 
flipped and rolled several times in the median when he tried to 
steer back onto the highway instead of braking or slowing to a stop 
there, and he and his passenger, Vaun Page, were ejected. Both men 
were seriously injured. McCorvey, previously an active cyclist, 
airplane pilot, sailor, and scuba diver (R. 3000 at 100), was 
4 
rendered a quadriplegic in nearly constant pain who requires round-
the-clock care (R. 2998 at 7, 18; R. 3003 at 7, 56). 
B. The Chip Seal Process 
The chip sealing technique used in this highway resurfacing 
project is common in Utah and elsewhere. First, 2" high reflector 
tabs are put in the roadway to serve as temporary lane markers (R. 
3004 at 151; Ex. 239). Next, a layer of asphalt emulsion is 
sprayed onto a section of one highway lane by a distributor (R. 
3004 at 200), followed immediately by the "chip box," a machine 
that puts down a thick layer of loose gravel chips and evenly 
spreads them in a swath 13.5 feet wide. A heavy, .rubber-tired 
machine with a roller the width of one lane follows and then twice 
rolls the lane longitudinally to push the chips into the sticky 
emulsion (R. 3007 at 39; R. 3004 at 226). In all chip sealing, 
more gravel chips than can possibly stick are deliberately laid 
down at first so the chips that eventually do adhere will be as 
densely spaced as possible, ultimately leaving a smooth rock 
surface (R. 3004 at 150; Unnumbered Transcript of November 20, 1990 
at 8-9). The newly chipped roadway is broomed as necessary with a 
large sweeper that removes the surplus loose chips that remain 
after rolling (R. 3004 at 165). Normal highway traffic is used as 
the final step in the chip resealing process. It is usually 
allowed back onto the lane 2-3 hours after rolling (Transcript of 
November 20, 1990 at 14). The gravel chips eventually become 
firmly imbedded into the emulsion to form a smooth new road surface 
as cars travel repeatedly over them (R. 3007 at 28). 
5 
C. The Cove Fort Project 
In May 1986, the resurfacing project at issue in this case, 
the Cove Fort Project, was let out for bid by UDOT, which is 
responsible for maintaining the interstate highways. The project 
consisted of the chip resealing of thirty-four miles of 1-15 and I-
70. On 1-15, the twelve-mile long project site ran from milemarker 
144 south past the hilltop Dog Valley rest area at milemarker 136, 
continuing south past the 1-70 Cove Fort interchange, down to 
milemarker 132 (R. 3004 at 142-44).2 Special Provision 405.09 of 
the project's plans required the contractor to submit a traffic 
control plan, prior to doing the resurfacing work, fo^ approval by 
UDOT's project engineer (Ex. 8 at 15), Richard Griffin. In the bid 
packet given to prospective bidders, UDOT included a copy of a 
traffic control plan (Ex. 10, Addendum Item B) for the bidder's 
consideration (R. 2998 at 28). LeGrand's bid was accepted and it 
entered into a contract with UDOT incorporating the project bid 
specifications and special provisions (Exs. 7, 8, Addendum Items C 
and D). LeGrand's vice-president notified project engineer Griffin 
in late July that LeGrand intended to use the traffic control plan 
that was included in the project bid packet and added, "We have 
reviewed this with our personnel and feel it is adequate for safety 
of employees as well as the travelling public on this particular 
project." (Ex. 72, Addendum Item E). 
2The critical section of the project from milemarker 137 south 
to milemarker 134 is shown in Ex. 115, which also shows the drop in 
elevation on southbound 1-15 at these points. A reduced copy of 
Ex. 115 is included as Item A in a separately bound Addendum to 
Opening Brief of Cross-Appellant Utah Department of Transportation. 
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The approved traffic control plan called for rectangular "DO 
NOT PASS NEXT 15 MILES" signs at the beginning of this resurfacing 
project, which was on the southbound lanes of 1-15 at milemarker 
144 (R 3004 at 168). The next signs a motorist would come to were: 
"ROADWORK AHEAD" signs on either side of the southbound lanes; 500' 
beyond this, "RIGHT [or LEFT] LANE CLOSED AHEAD" signs; and 500' 
beyond, "LOOSE GRAVEL" signs. This trio of diamond-shaped, black 
on orange advance signs could not be placed more than five miles 
ahead of the ongoing chip sealing. Next, black on white "DO NOT 
PASS" signs were to be affixed to the top of the roadway 
delineators (posts with amber reflectors) on both sides of the road 
at approximately one mile intervals (Ex. 10, Addendum Item B; R. 
3004 at 170). At approximately 1000' before the first piece of 
working chipping machinery, there was to be an early warner sign in 
the closed lane of traffic where chipping was going on, with a 
black on white 25 mph regulatory speed limit sign.3 The early 
warner (shown in photo Ex. 58, Addendum Item F) is a large sign 
with a flashing series of lights in an arrow shape that points to 
the unclosed lane. It is on wheels so it can be moved with the 
chipping machinery as resurfacing progresses down a section of 
highway lane. The last sign on the traffic control plan is one 
that says "END CONSTRUCTION," placed where drivers would pass the 
3The 25 mph signs actually used on the Cove Fort project were 
black on orange, not black on white (R. 3004 at 171). A black on 
white sign is regulatory, meaning it must be complied with by 
drivers, while a black on orange speed limit sign is advisory only 
(R. 2998 at 221-222; R. 3004 at 219). 
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last piece of chipping machinery (Ex. 10, Addendum Item B). 
The traffic control plan said nothing about whether LeGrand 
was required to keep a newly chipped portion of a lane closed to 
normal traffic until after the surplus chips had been swept; UDOT 
Project Engineer Griffin said once it was rolled, a lane could be 
reopened to travel by LeGrand (R. 3004 at 190-91). Section 405.09 
of the State of Utah's Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge 
Construction (1979 ed.) required the contractor to reopen a lane 
after rolling (Ex. 110; R. 3000 at 67). According to Griffin, 
given the choice of two open lanes, one swept and one unswept, most 
drivers would choose the better, swept lane (R. 3004vat 227). 
The approved traffic control plan did not address restriction 
of the speed that traffic could travel on a reopened, newly 
chipped, but unswept lane (R. 3004 at 191, 198). Although the "DO 
NOT PASS" signs remained in place when a newly chipped lane was 
reopened, the early warners with the 25 mph speed limit signs were 
to be on the highway only so long as there was actual chipping work 
going on (R. 3004 at 193). They were to be pulled off the highway 
once rolling of the chips was finished (R. 3004 at 191-93). 
Griffin considered the regular 55 mph speed limit safe even prior 
to sweeping in light of the "LOOSE GRAVEL" warning signs and the 
regulatory "DO NOT PASS" signs to limit windshield damage, as well 
as the presence of the gravel chips themselves, which make a 
increasingly loud rumbling and rattling sound as a car moves faster 
over them (R. 3004 at 198, 219-22; R. 2998 at 206). All of these 
would alert reasonable drivers to the condition of the road and 
8 
allow them to reduce their speed to fit the existing conditions (R. 
3004 at 221-22). Peter Holtan, who designs work zone traffic 
control plans for UDOT, agreed that in chip seal projects a traffic 
control planner takes into account the existing hazard that is 
apparent to drivers from the sight and sounds of loose gravel and 
their normal reactions to them (R. 2998 at 206-07). These 
conditions control traffic even if there are no warning signs 
posted (R. 2998 at 206). 
The actual spreading of gravel chips began on the Cove Fort 
project on Friday, August lf 1986, when both lanes of southbound I-
15 from milemarker 142 to 138 were spread with chipsf rolled, and 
swept (Ex. 20 at 2). Griffin visited the inactive project site on 
Sunday, August 3. He calculated that too much gravel was being 
laid down and concluded that the "LOOSE GRAVEL" and "ROADWORK 
AHEAD" signs were too far in advance of where the actual chipping 
operation was going on because traffic was not slowing down until 
it actually came upon the new chips (R. 3004 at 173-75, 178-79, 
188-89). These concerns were relayed in a memo (Ex. 11, Addendum 
Item G) to Curtis Berry, the UDOT inspector who was on the project 
site each day (R. 3005 at 89). Griffin suggested that the 
contractor chip only one lane each day, instead of both lanes in 
one day, in order to reduce the number of chips being pulled up by 
normal traffic and flipped over before the emulsion hardened (Ex. 
11; R. 3004 at 234-36). 
Griffin learned on August 4 at the project site that he had 
miscalculated the amount of gravel spread on August 1; the actual 
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amount was much less, within contract specifications, and the chip 
spreader was fine tuned on August 4 to distribute 23 pounds of 
chips per square yard (R. 3004 at 193-94, 231-32; R. 3005 at 105). 
The "LOOSE GRAVEL" and "ROADWORK AHEAD" signs were thereafter moved 
up closer to the actual chipping operations (R. 3004 at 234-35). 
Both lanes of southbound 1-15 were chipped from milemarker 144 
to 141.4 on August 4 and from milemarker 137.9 to 136.2 on August 
5 (Ex. 20). The inside (left) southbound lane from milemarker 
136.2 to 133 was chipped, rolled, and swept on August 5 (Ex. 20; R. 
2998 at 30).A On August 6, the ramps of the Dog Valley interchange 
were chipped. On August 7, first the outside (rightj southbound 
lane from milemarker 136.2 to 133 was chipped, then both southbound 
lanes from milemarker 133 to 132. Chipping then continued that 
afternoon on the ramps of the Cove Fort interchange at milemarker 
135. The inside (left) lane of 1-15 had been rolled and swept by 
the time of McCorvey's accident. The section of the outside 
(right) lane from milemarker 136 downhill to milemarker 133 had 
been rolled, but LeGrand's project supervisor, Steven Peterson, was 
unsure how much of this section had been swept (R. 2998 at 30). On 
August 8, the chipping operation was to proceed on the northbound 
lanes of 1-15. 
D. The Accident 
The late afternoon of August 7, 1986, was clear, hot and 
sunny. C. Dewey Taylor was southbound on 1-15 pulling a trailer 
* The accident occurred at milemarker 134.2. See Addendum 
Item A. 
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with his GMC Suburban. As he approached the project site in the 
outside (right) lane, he passed a sign 300-400 yards before the 
hilltop Dog Valley rest area (at milemarker 136.5) that warned of 
the construction zone and the danger of windshield damage and 
advised a 25 mph speed limit. He slowed to 20-30 mph because there 
were heavy gravel chips in both lanes. Several cars passed him on 
the left, including the McCorvey Honda travelling 50-60 mph, 
throwing up chips (R. 3009 at 102-04, 114, 120). A van driven by 
Paul Wayne Wright next came up behind Taylor going too fast; Taylor 
pulled over into the left lane to keep the van from passing. Three 
or four times, Wright pulled over into the right lane, then back 
into the left, but Taylor moved in front of the van each time to 
keep it from passing. At the crest of the hill (at about 
milemarker 136.3), Wright accelerated to 60 mph behind Taylor in 
the left lane and pulled out onto the left shoulder to pass Taylor. 
At that point, Taylor moved to the right and let the van pass. In 
doing so, with two of its wheels on the left shoulder, Wright's van 
threw up gravel chips that broke Taylor's windshield (R. 3009 at 
105). Because of the chips on the roadway, Taylor would have 
slowed down to 25 mph even if there had been no warnings signs; in 
his opinion, Wright and McCorvey were both travelling at 
unreasonably high speeds for the road conditions (R. 3009 at 119-
22).5 
Semi driver Edward Villareal also was southbound on the same 
5Minutes later, at the accident scene, Taylor confronted 
Wright, saying "I should have run you off the road. Can't you guys 
understand that it said no passing?" (R. 3009 at 105). 
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stretch of 1-15 late that afternoon. The McCorvey Honda passed him 
before they reached the project site. Villareal moved back into 
the inside (left) lane and then slowed to 40 mph once within the 
project site. Several impatient drivers tried to pass him by using 
the outside (right) lane, throwing up gravel. At the hilltop Dog 
Valley rest area at milemarker 136.5, after passing through miles 
of chipped surface, Wright passed Villareal on the right doing 70 
mph, throwing up gravel that broke a window in the truck. 
Villareal watched down the straight stretch of highway as the 
Wright van first moved back into the inside (left) lane and pulled 
up behind the McCorvey Honda in that lane, doing 70-75 mph, then 
moved to the outside (right) lane. As Wright pulled alongside 
McCorvey, Villareal said the Honda "gave a little wiggle" and 
veered off the highway toward the center median at the 134.2 
milemarker. Villareal saw no brake lights on the Honda or the van. 
(R. 3004 at 6-10, 20, 36-39). 
Paul Wayne Wright followed behind McCorvey in the inside 
(left) lane going past the rest area at milemarker 136.5 and for a 
ways down the hill.6 At a 1988 deposition, Wright's wife said 
McCorvey's Honda went back and forth twice onto the gravel on the 
shoulder of the inside lane, throwing up gravel as it did; the 
Honda's wheels were just outside the lane a tire's width (R. 3007 
6A flagger just south of the Cove Fort overpass at milemarker 
135 saw McCorvey coming down the hill too fast and stepped out*into 
the outside lane a bit to slow him down (R. 3007 at 56-57). The 
Honda just went around him, with Page and McCorvey looking at the 
flagger and mimicking him as they passed, and did not slow down (R. 
3007 at 67). 
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at 122-25). Wright pulled his one-ton GMC van over into the 
outside (right) lane and pulled up alongside the Honda when his 
wife asked him to back off from the gravel being thrown by the 
Honda, which had broken their windshield (R. 3007 at 158-60, 116). 
Wright then pulled slightly ahead of the Honda (R. 3007 at 109). 
Wright's brother Brian, also a passenger in the van, estimated both 
cars were then going 50-55 mph (R. 3007 at 142). Brian looked over 
at the Honda and saw McCorvey speed up and pass the van at 60-65 
mph, which he considered an unsafe speed for conditions. 
McCorvey's passenger, Page, was saying something, but the window 
was closed (R. 3007 at 143, 154).7 Page flipped the, bird at the 
van occupants as the Honda accelerated past (R. 3007 at 76, 143). 
As McCorvey sped ahead of him, Paul Wayne Wright saw the Honda 
pull up next to and slightly behind a semi, then fishtail three or 
four times, prompting Wright to take his foot off the gas pedal (R. 
3007 at 162-63). He then watched the Honda go off into the median 
and then veer back toward the highway and roll (R. 3007 at 163-65). 
Wright's sister-in-law also saw McCorvey move left into thick 
gravel on the left lane shoulder before losing control (R. 3007 at 
95). She estimated the semi was four to five van lengths ahead of 
them and that the Honda had passed them, going 10-15 mph faster 
than the van, and pulled ahead several car lengths before 
fishtailing in the thick rocks at the left edge of the roadway, 
7At her pretrial deposition, Wright's wife said she thought 
that Page was shouting at them and that he looked angry, which 
puzzled her since the gravel being thrown up by the Honda had just 
broken their van's windshield (R. 3007 at 118). 
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outside the lane of travel (R. 3007 at 77-78; 87-88). According to 
Wright and his sister-in-law, he had no trouble controlling his van 
and saw no reason for fishtailing on the flat stretch of road (R. 
3007 at 166, 80). He could hear gravel flipping up as he drove and 
had driven through chip seal projects before (R. 3007 at 167, 171). 
A different picture of the sequence of events before the Honda 
left the highway was painted by McCorvey, an experienced driver who 
was well acquainted with this stretch of 1-15 and who had travelled 
through chip seal operations in a variety of states and other 
countries (R. 3003 at 25, 27, 81-82, 86). He felt the resurfacing 
construction zone ended at the rest area at the top of the hill 
near milemarker 136 (R. 3003 at 16, 65, 70), approximately one mile 
after a radar detector in his car flipped off (R. 3003 at 87). He 
recalled no "LOOSE GRAVEL" signs or any other warning signs past 
that point, only 55 mph speed signs (R. 3003 at 16, 89, 94-94). As 
he drove down the hill from the rest area, the chips got sparser 
and the road "was in fine shape," although the lack of painted lane 
striping indicated that it was newly resurfaced (R. 3003 at 17, 66, 
88). He stayed in the left lane all the way down the hill,8 and 
he saw Wright was quite a ways behind him (R. 3003 at 17-18, 91). 
Just as he passed the Cove Fort interchange (at milemarker 
8
 At his pretrial deposition, McCorvey had said he went down 
the hill in the unswept outside (right) lane and was bombarded with 
rocks there from the van ahead. The noise from the gravel woke up 
Page. McCorvey asked Page what he would do in the situation and 
Page recommended that he move into the left lane, which McCorvey 
did about a fifth of a mile before the accident. He chose to 
maintain his speed and remain in the left lane next to the van so 
the thrown gravel would only hit the right side of his car. R. 
3003 at 109-110. 
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135), McCorvey claimed, the gravel got thick again and he had 
difficulty controlling his car in the clumps of gravel (R. 3003 at 
19, 70, 71, 75). He decided not to move into the right lane 
because he saw the gravel there was "very thick" (R. 3003 at 72). 
The loose gravel being pulled up was loud in his wheel wells, and 
he downshifted to only 41-45 mph (R. 3003 at 71, 76). By then, 
Wright was behind him about a hundred yards (R. 3003 at 19). 
McCorvey sped up to tell Wright not to pass, then tried to occupy 
both lanes to block Wright (R. 3003 at 97-99). Next, McCorvey said 
he slowed down, giving Wright "a taste of the rocks" (R. 3003 at 
98-99). Wright then "gunned it" and tried to pass on the right, 
showering McCorvey's car with gravel (R. 3003 at 20). The loud 
noise woke up his passenger, Page, who "communicated" with the 
occupants of the van alongside them, although McCorvey could not 
remember if that "communication" was Page giving the finger (R. 
3003 at 21, 24, 30). 
According to McCorvey, he was fishtailing and fighting to 
control his car for nearly a mile of bad road before losing control 
completely: "The car's doing what it wants. It's shimmying and 
shaking. I'm having to, like, steer one way to make the car go 
straight. And then I'd get another, I hit another pocket of 
gravel—It felt slick in the pockets of gravel." (R. 3003 at 22, 
70, 100, 103, 106, 107). In the meantime, Wright's van threw up 
gravel that McCorvey thought broke the Honda's windshield (R. 3003 
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at 23, 105).9 Travelling in the low 50fs with Wright beside him, 
McCorvey said he saw the one-ton van start to go out of control and 
he claimed he was afraid Wright would kill them all by passsing on 
the right (R. 3003 at 100). McCorvey fishtailed three or four 
times, then decided to give up and not try to keep up with Wright: 
MI'm not having a chariot race. It's like there's no other way, he 
can have the road. I'm not going to go those speeds, so I gave 
up." (R. 3003 at 23, 78, 100).10 At that point, he claimed, he 
downshifted, accelerated, got caught in a clump of gravel over at 
the edge of the road, and fishtailed out of control (R. 3003 at 21-
23, 100, 102).u He estimated it was only a couple of seconds 
between Page's "communication" with the Wright van occupants and 
the time he left the road (R. 3003 at 31). 
Highway Patrolman Max Shields had been through the entire 
eleven miles of project site just ahead of McCorvey and Wright, 
driving past the "NO PASSING" and "DO NOT PASS" signs, seeing 
nothing unusual about this chip seal job, and observing no problems 
with the traffic flow (R. 3006 at 118-121, 130). He parked his car 
and then stopped a motorist at milemarker 133 for disobeying the 
9At his pretrial deposition, McCorvey said it was his bug 
screen or gravel guard, not his windshield, that had been broken by 
flying gravel (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 80; R. 3003 at 
109). 
10No mention was made by McCorvey of the semi that Wright and 
his brother testified was just ahead and to the right of McCorvey 
when he left the road. 
nLater, in the ambulance, an emergency medical technician 
asked Page, injured but coherent, what happened. Page responded, 
"We were going too fast. We came upon traffic, tried to pass on 
the left, and lost control." (R. 3006 at 107). See note 8, supra. 
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"DO NOT PASS" signs throughout the project. While issuing a 
warning citation, he saw the cloud of dust created when McCorvey 
lost control of his car and entered the median (R. 3006 at 120-22). 
Shields went immediately to the accident scene, but saw nothing in 
the depth of the gravel chips on the roadway to indicate why 
McCorvey had lost control and left the highway at Point A in photo 
Exhibit 3k (R. 3006 at 140, 177-79). However, Exhibits 3z, 3kx, 
31x and 4c (in Addendum Item J), photographs taken within hours of 
the accident, show a ridge of excess gravel along the left shoulder 
of the inside (left) lane where McCorvey veered off into the median 
(R. 2998 at 86-87).ll 
Referring to the photographs in Exhibit 61, Plaintiff's 
accident reconstructionist, Ernest Klein, pointed out a 1-1 1/2" 
ridge of gravel on the shoulder of the inside (left) lane at Point 
A. In his opinion, these mounds of gravel along the shoulder of 
the inside lane, also shown in photo Exs. 31x and 3kx, caused an 
induced steer—which looks from the rear like fishtailing—that 
sent McCorvey off the highway at 52-62 mph (R. 3002 at 17, 19, 28, 
30, 36-37, 41-42, 47). Klein also opined that another contributing 
cause of this accident was LeGrand's signing of the project site at 
the time. The signs posted did not, Klein said, adequately warn 
drivers of the loose gravel hazard; they did not clearly tell 
McCorvey and the other drivers what lane they should be in and what 
12Point A is also in the area of a construction joint in the 
inside (left) lane. A construction joint is a spot where the 
laying and spreading of gravel chips is stopped and then later 
resumed, leaving a double layer of gravel that must be removed (R. 
2998 at 90-92). 
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speed they should be going as they travelled south from milemarker 
136 to 134 (R. 3002 at 33, 36, 49, 51). 
Klein conceded McCorvey could have slowed down his speed of up 
to 65 mph when he encountered the "mounds" of gravel (R. 3002 at 
55, 61). McCorvey also had the room to slow down once into the 
median, but there was no evidence that he braked (R. 3002 at 63, 
68). Instead, McCorvey caused his car to rollover when he turned 
it sharply back toward the highway (R. 3002 at 67). 
LeGrand's project supervisor, Steven Peterson, arrived at the 
accident site soon after it happened. After a short time, he left 
and drove north to the beginning of the project to check the 
signing (R. 2998 at 49-52). He drove slowly south through the 
project, making notes on scratch paper of the location of the 
warning signs and construction workers at the time of the accident. 
The next day, Peterson drew up two signing diagrams from the notes 
(R. 2998 at 53-54; Exs. 35 and 36, Addendum Items H and I). 
According to Peterson's diagrams, McCorvey and Wright had passed: 
"DO NOT PASS NEXT 15 MILES" signs at about milemarker 144.4; "ROAD 
CONSTRUCTION AHEAD" signs 500' feet later; "DO NOT PASS" signs at 
milemarker 144 and at every mile to milemarker 137; "RIGHT LANE 
CLOSED" signs at the entrance to the rest area; "LOOSE GRAVEL" 
signs 500' later; flagman symbol signs at the exit from the rest 
area; another pair of "DO NOT PASS" signs at milemarker 136; an 
early warner in the right lane moving traffic to the left lane just 
before the Cove Fort interchange exit at milemarker 135; a flagman 
at the exit ramp, where the chipping crew was working at the time 
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of McCorvey's accident; and another early warner just before the 
Cove Fort interchange on ramp at approximately milemarker 134.6. 
According to traffic control planner Holtan, all of the signing on 
this project would have been visible to drivers on the straight 
section of highway (R. 2998 at 203). 
The memories of various witnesses at the November 1990 trial 
conflicted with Peterson's account of what warning signs were 
actually in place at the time of McCorvey's accident more than four 
years earlier. C. Dewey Taylor, for example, claimed there was 
only one sign warning of the construction and it was located before 
the rest area at the top of the hill, which is at milemarker 136.5. 
He remembered no early warner with a flashing arrow at the Cove 
Fort interchange off ramp or under the Cove Fort overpass and no 
flagmen or flagmen symbol signs (R. 3009 at 102-03, 108, 117), 
although he did remember a 25 mph speed limit sign (R. 3009 at 
118). Taylor remembered going by only two "DO NOT PASS" signs on 
the right side of the road between the start of the project at 
milemarker 144 and the accident site (R. 3009 at 116). 
Villareal said there was no second early warner parked under 
the Cove Fort overpass and that there was only one warning sign, at 
the start of the construction zone, no signs by the rest area, and 
no "NO PASSING" signs in the construction zone (R. 3004 at 15, 22, 
28, 30. 44). Although he remembered a "ROAD CONSTRUCTION" and 
flagman sign at the rest area, Wright could not recall any early 
warners, "LOOSE GRAVEL" signs, or "RIGHT LANE CLOSED" signs (R. 
3007 at 157-58). McCorvey recalled no flagmen, "RIGHT LANE CLOSED" 
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or "LOOSE GRAVEL" signs north or south of the rest area, and no 
early warners anywhere (R. 3003 at 89-90, 94-95). On the other 
hand, Wright's sister-in-law and wife both saw the 25 mph advisory 
speed limit sign at the top of the hill, at about milemarker 136.3, 
and the latter remembered "DO NOT PASS" signs (R. 3007 at 91-92; 
107, 127). Wright's wife, the front seat passenger, also testified 
at her deposition that there could have been an early warner sign 
with flashing lights because something was funneling cars into the 
left lane, but she could not be sure (R. 3007 at 131-33). In 
addition, although LeGrand employee David Merchant testified at 
trial that on August 7, 1986, he had set up the "RIGHT, LANE CLOSED" 
signs required by the traffic control plan, his testimony was 
impeached with his prior inconsistent deposition statement that he 
had not posted such signs that day, but had set them up and leaned 
them over on the side of the road where they could not be seen (R. 
3006 at 67-68, 75). Throughout trial, plaintiff suggested that the 
two early warners and "ROADWORK AHEAD" signs required by the 
traffic control plan when there was actual chip spreading going on 
in a highway lane, as well as some of the "DO NOT PASS" signs, were 
not actually in place at the time of the accident, but that 
Peterson or other LeGrand personnel had moved them into position in 
time to be photographed in Exs. 3 and 4 (Addendum Item J) within 
hours after the accident (e.g., R. 2998 at 216-217; R. 3008 at 108-
10). 
This factual dispute aside, plaintiff's expert traffic 
engineer, Edward Ruzak, stated that even if the signing in 
20 
Peterson's diagrams was in place at the time of the accident, it 
was inadequate for guiding drivers through the project site and 
that this inadequacy caused McCorvey's accident (R. 2999 at 43-44). 
The main deficiency was that, even though there were "DO NOT PASS" 
signs, LeGrand did nothing to close down the unswept outside 
(right) lane by making it physically impossible for Wright to enter 
it and try to pass McCorvey while throwing up loose chips at his 
car (R. 2999 at 50-52). 
In the opinion of defendants' traffic control and chip seal 
expert, Richard Leuttich, the traffic control plan itself had 
nothing to do with this accident. The plan was meant to control 
and move traffic, more than 2,000 vehicles per day here, through 
the portion of the project in which there was active chip spreading 
work going on. McCorvey had safely passed beyond that point, which 
was at the Cove Fort interchange ramps. Thus, even if the 
project's signing plan was flawed, it was not a cause of this 
accident (R. 3006 at 227-30, 234), a view echoed by UDOT's traffic 
control plan designer (R. 2998 at 205). Leuttich concluded there 
was no reason why traffic could not use both lanes of southbound I-
15 past the interchange, noting it is a reasonable and common 
industry practice to allow traffic back on to a newly rolled but 
unswept section of freshly chipped roadway (R. 3006 at 229, 236, 
238, 260). Although he agreed that state and federal regulations 
suggest traffic be controlled once allowed to travel an unswept but 
rolled lane, in Leuttich's judgment that control is normally 
provided by the road conditions themselves, particularly by the 
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amount of noise made by the gravel on a vehicle, because prudent 
-drivers respond by slowing down to reasonable speeds (R. 3006 at 
238, 252-53, 255). The advisory speed limit signs were posted as 
a warning to reduce the throwing of chips (R. 3006 at 231). 
Furthermore, if you leave two lanes open, a driver will take the 
most advantageous lane; thus, if one is full of unswept chips, the 
average driver will take the one that is not (R. 3006 at 236). 
Leuttich rejected as unnecessary and dangerous the 
recommendation of plaintiff's experts that up to five miles of the 
outside, unswept southbound lane should have been closed off with 
orange traffic cones or another channelizing device until swept (R. 
3006 at 230-31). He also rejected McCorvey's claim that he was 
hopelessly "trapped" in the inside lane, since McCorvey could have 
escaped any gravel being thrown at his car from the unswept outside 
lane by simply slowing down and dropping back (R. 3006 at 232). 
Defendants' other chip seal expert, Robert Galloway, saw no 
evidence in the photo exhibits of windshield breakage or other 
gravel damage on the Honda in the photos taken at the accident 
scene (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 21). He also saw nothing 
in the amount of gravel shown in the photo series taken shortly 
after the accident (Exs. P3 and P4, Addendum Item J) to explain 
McCorvey's loss of control since he had three times as much 
friction as he needed to successfully complete a passing maneuver 
in the inside (left) southbound lane (Transcript of November 20, 
1990 at 31-33). Darkened wheel paths, called "tracking," in photos 
Exs. 3f, 3g, 3h, 3i and 3k show that vehicles using the inside lane 
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were making contact with the rock. Photo Ex. 3m shows oil staining 
of the grassy tracks of McCorvey's car as it veered off the 
roadway, indicating that his tires had been touching the road 
(Transcript of November 20# 1990 at 38). Furthermore, the slope on 
the shoulder down into the median could be safely driven, if 
needed, by someone using sound judgment who was not going too fast 
(Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 27-28). 
Galloway thought an advisory 25 mph limit was a judicious 
speed limit on the unswept chipped and rolled interstate lane for 
the first 24 hours in order to reduce rock turnover and damage to 
windshields and car paint. It would have been desirable, in his 
view, to have placed advisory 25 mph speed limit signs every 500-
1,000' for speed control, but this would be more than what was 
called for by the recommendations in the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 54-55, 57). 
In the opinion of defendants' accident reconstructionist, 
Newell Knight, this rollover accident was caused solely by driver 
error; McCorvey was inattentive to the apparent conditions in the 
road's driving path (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 66, 109). 
He found was no objective evidence of anything on the inside lane 
of traffic that caused McCorvey to lose control of his car 
(Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 74). There was no excess of 
gravel from the chipping two days before, and what had been put 
down had imbedded into the emulsion (Transcript of November 20, 
1990 at 72). There was no excess gravel in the lane at the point 
where McCorvey left it that would have caused any difficulty in 
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steering (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 95). There were no 
marks left in the inside lane, as would be expected if McCorvey had 
lost control there in thick gravel; there was only a gradual runoff 
mark of McCorvey's car as it ran off the road edge and entered the 
median, indicating no abrupt movement on the roadway itself 
(Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 72-73, 75). 
Photo Exs. 3e, 3k, 4b and 4f show the texture of the roadway, 
the amount of gravel in the roadway, and the obvious dark wear 
pattern of traffic in the newly resurfaced inside (left) lane all 
the way down the hill from the rest area, past the Cove Fort 
overpass and down past the accident site (Transcript of November 
20, 1990 at 68-69, 75-76). See photos in Addendum Item J. The 
dark tracks of normal traffic in the inside (left) lane, shown in 
numerous photos taken shortly after the accident, indicate that the 
chips there had already embedded in the emulsion (Transcript of 
November 20, 1990 at 67-68, 69). Photo Ex. 3o shows the depth of 
the gravel against the 2" high tabs and at the edge of the road, as 
well as the wear pattern of traffic through the compressed gravel 
chips in the inside (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 69-70). In 
photo Ex. 3r, one can see a wide crayon mark drawn by the 
investigating officers on the compacted gravel at the very edge of 
the inside (left) lane (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 70). 
According to Knight, McCorvey had neither driven reasonably 
nor reacted reasonably to the conditions he said he encountered in 
the left lane (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 80-83). 
McCorvey's car was purportedly being hit and damaged by loose 
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gravel, he was angry, and he was having trouble controlling his car 
once past the Cove Fort interchange at milemarker 135? nonetheless, 
McCorvey never slowed down (Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 82). 
A reasonable driver under these circumstances would have 
decelerated and dropped back to avoid any gravel being thrown by 
other cars; instead, McCorvey responded by trying to go even faster 
to pass, moved outside the travel path in the left lane, and lost 
control in gravel on the inside highway shoulder (Transcript of 
November 20, 1990 at 82). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
McCorvey's passenger, Page, filed suit first (No. C87-3404), 
in June 1987, claiming his injuries were the result of negligence 
by McCorvey, the State, and various John Does (R. 002, 004). Page 
and McCorvey reached a settlement in October 1987 and the latter 
was dismissed out as a defendant in Page's suit (R. 081; 0101). 
In December 1987, UDOT filed a third-party complaint against 
McCorvey alleging that his negligent driving was the proximate 
cause of Page's injuries (R. 0114-15). Three months later, 
McCorvey filed a separate lawsuit (No. C88-1818) against UDOT and 
LeGrand. In his sole cause of action against UDOT, McCorvey 
alleged that UDOT and/or LeGrand had negligently caused a dangerous 
condition to exist on the highway (Separate Record in C88-1818 at 
002-05, Addendum Item K).13 In answer, UDOT denied negligence and 
13
 McCorvey's pleaded claims against LeGrand were based on its 
allegedly negligent performance of the actual resurfacing and the 
implementation of traffic control at the project, as well as the 
allegedly deficient traffic control plan itself. 
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asserted that McCorvey's injuries were solely caused by his own 
negligence or that of other defendants. Alternatively, UDOT 
asserted that his negligence was greater than that of any by UDOT 
(Separate Record in C88-1818 at 020-23). 
The two lawsuits were consolidated (R. 0153),u and Paul Wayne 
Wright was brought in as a defendant in September 1988 (R. 0179). 
He was, however, dismissed out as a party defendant by McCorvey and 
Wright three months before trial, although his proportionate fault 
was still to be determined at trial (R. 1827). 
Trial commenced on November 7, 1990. Defendants' motions for 
a directed verdict (R. 3007 at 103; R. 3008 at 37, 118-128) were 
denied (R. 3008 at 135). The jurors were instructed and they 
retired to begin deliberations at 1:00 pm the day before 
Thanksgiving, November 21, 1990 (R. 3008 at 112). They returned 
with a special verdict at 6:30 pm (R. 3008 at 134), in which they 
found that each of the following persons or entities was negligent 
as claimed, that their negligence was the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries, and that their relative proportions of fault 
were as follows: 
LeGrand Johnson Construction Co. 50% 
State of Utah 28% 
Daniel McCorvey 10% 
Wayne Wright 12% 
(R. 02521-23). The jury found McCorvey's damages to be $5,421,282 
(R. 02523). After denial of defendants' motions for new trial (R. 
uPage's claims against all defendants were eventually 
dismissed in a post-trial order based on the parties' stipulations 
R. 2599). 
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2683-2704, 2732-33, 2903, 2916), judgment was entered against 
LeGrand for $2,710,641 and against UDOT for $250,000 (R. 2659-
63).15 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In light of the jury's other special findings, reasonable 
minds could not have concluded from the evidence presented that 
negligent omissions from UDOT's traffic control plan were the 
proximate cause of harm to McCorvey. UDOT's negligence could not 
be a substantial factor in bringing about that harm because of the 
overwhelmingly predominant effects of the subsequent negligent 
conduct by McCorvey, Wright, and LeGrand. Even if it were such, as 
a matter of law either LeGrand's subsequent intervening conduct or 
the subsequent intervening conduct of McCorvey and Wright, 
intervening forces which were legally unforeseeable, constituted a 
superseding proximate cause of the harm to McCorvey. 
If the evidence is viewed in a light favorable to the jury's 
special verdict finding McCorvey negligent, no jury acting fairly 
and reasonably could have also found that UDOT's failure to adopt 
a traffic control plan physically preventing this side-by-side road 
race through a part of the chip seal resurfacing project was more 
blameworthy than McCorvey's own voluntary engagement in one with 
Wright despite the known danger and the obvious risks involved. 
It was prejudicial error to give a sudden peril jury 
instruction because that doctrine was implicitly extinguished by 
15The State's proportionate liability of $1,517,800 was reduced 
to $250,000 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34(1) (1989). 
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the legislature's abandonment of the contributory negligence system 
that engendered the doctrine in the first place. An actor's 
conduct in light of any sudden peril faced should be evaluated for 
its reasonableness and its culpability in accordance with standard 
comparative fault principles. In any event, the trial court 
prejudicially erred in giving Instruction 33 because the evidence 
compels the conclusion that any sudden peril faced by McCorvey was 
the product of his own negligent conduct. 
ARGUMENTS 
!• THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT ANY NEGLIGENT 
DEFICIENCIES IN UDOT'S TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN 
WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF McCORVEY'S INJURY. 
Negligence is conduct which falls below the standard 
established by law for the protection of others against an 
unreasonable risk of injury: 
It necessarily involves a foreseeable risk, a threatened 
danger of injury, and conduct unreasonable in proportion 
to the danger. If one could not reasonably foresee any 
injury as the result of one's act, or if one's conduct 
was reasonable in light of what one could anticipate, 
there would be no negligence, and no liability. 
Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts § 43, at 280 (5th ed. 1984) 
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter "Prosser"1. McCorvey's theory of 
UDOT's negligence and liability was based on alleged deficiencies 
in the traffic control plan on the Cove Fort Project (R. 3008 at 
63; R. 01024). First, the warning signs and devices in the plan 
did not adequately warn drivers of the hazard presented by the 
loose resurfacing material in southbound 1-15. Second, the traffic 
control plan should have either (a) physically closed off the 
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outside (right) lane to traffic from milemarker 136 to 134 until it 
was swept (R. 3008 at 48, 63),16 or (b) imposed traffic speeds in 
the open, unswept outside lane slower than the posted 55 mph 
regulatory limit (R. 01024-30). UDOT's theory of the case was that 
McCorvey and Wright were the proximate causes of McCorvey's 
injuries because they had negligently failed to: observe and 
respond to the apparent, existing road conditions; reduce speeds 
accordingly; keep safe distances from other cars; adhere to posted 
speed limit and "DO NOT PASS" signs; and change lanes properly, all 
with due regard for their own safety and that of other drivers (R. 
02560-61). 
To succeed on his negligence claim against UDOT, McCorvey 
was required to establish that: UDOT owed McCorvey a duty of 
reasonable care not to approve a traffic control plan that exposed 
him to an unreasonable risk of harm; UDOT breached that duty by 
approving a traffic control plan with one of the omissions noted 
above (negligence); the breach of duty was the proximate cause of 
McCorveyfs injuries; and there was, in fact, injury. Reeves, 813 
P.2d at 116; Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). 
Proximate cause is ordinarily a matter to be determined by the 
jury, Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985); 
Godeskv v. Provo Citv Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 544 (Utah 1984); 
Thompson v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 688 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 
16As evidence of this deficiency in the plan, McCorvey 
contended that it did not conform with the recommended methods for 
signing and lane closure set out in the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Devices (Ex. 38). 
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1984). However, the absence of proximate cause can be determined 
as a matter of law if evidence of causation is lacking or if 
reasonable minds could not differ on the evidence presented as to 
what was or was not the proximate cause of the injury. Mitchell, 
697 P.2d at 245; Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 611 
P.2d 363, 365 n.4 (Utah 1980); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
434(1) (1965); £ee. Steffensen v. Smith's Mcrctt. Corp., 172 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 36, 38 (Utah App. 1991). 
"Proximate cause" is routinely defined by Utah appellate 
courts as 
that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces 
the injury and without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one that 
necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish 
the injury. 
Steffensen, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 38 (quoting State v. Lawson, 688 
P.2d 479, 482 & n.3 (Utah 1984)); accord Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245-
46; Watters v. Ouerrv, 626 P.2d 455, 455 (Utah 1981). This 
definition highlights the cause-in-fact aspect of proximate 
causation. But the term "proximate cause" also has a public policy 
aspect, often referred to as "legal cause" by many courts and 
commentators,17 which limits the potentially boundless liability 
of an actor whose conduct is a "cause" of plaintiff's injury in the 
but/for sense: 
Once it has been established that the defendant's 
conduct has in fact been one of the causes of the 
17E.g., Prosser §§ 41-42 (and cases cited therein); Thode, 
"Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of 
Functions between Judge and Jury," 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1, 15. 
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plaintiff's injury, there remains the question whether 
the defendant should be legally responsible for the 
injury. Unlike the fact of causation, with which it is 
often hopelessly confused, this is primarily a problem of 
law. It is sometimes said to depend on whether the 
conduct has been so significant and important a cause 
that the defendant should be legally responsible. But 
both significance and importance turn upon conclusions in 
terms of legal policy, so that they depend essentially on 
whether the policy of the law will extend the 
responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which 
have in fact occurred. 
Prosser § 42, at 272-73 (footnotes omitted); see id. § 43, at 281; 
Thode, supra note 16, at 8. In Utah, appellate courts have 
addressed these policy limitations on the scope of an actor's 
liability under the rubric of "proximate cause," although 
alternative theories of analysis are possible. See, 4.Q.. Prosser 
§43 and cited cases. As this Court has stated, 
Proximate cause is a legal construct calling for a legal 
conclusion based on various factors in addition to an 
actual cause-effect relationship. It is common place in 
the law that an act, omission, or force may be an actual 
cause, but not a proximate cause. 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 
1985).18 
There are two distinct bases for concluding that the evidence 
is insufficient to support a finding that any omission in UDOT's 
traffic control plan was the legal cause of the injury McCorvey 
incurred when he lost control of his car in thick gravel and ran 
off the highway. Stated another way, there are two reasons why no 
18In closing argument, McCorvey's counsel twice erroneously 
informed the jurors that a "proximate cause," defined for them in 
Instruction 35 (R. 02565), is simply any cause that meets a but/for 
test, i.e., ••[B]ut for that failure to control traffic" and "[B]ut 
for that conduct [of defendants] would there have been any 
accident?" (R. 3008 at 62, 63). 
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reasonable jury could conclude, on the evidence presented, that 
UDOT's negligence was a proximate cause of McCorvey's injury, even 
if it was a cause-in-fact in the but/for sense. 
A. UDOT's negligence could not be the legal cause 
of the harm to McCorvey: omissions from the 
traffic control plan were not a substantial 
causative factor in light of the 
overwhelmingly predominant effects of the 
other, subsequent contributing causative 
actions of McCorvey, Wright, and LeGrand. 
The proximate cause element of a negligence claim requires the 
plaintiff to show both that defendant's conduct is a cause-in-fact 
of the plaintiff's injury and that defendant's conduct was a 
"substantial causative factor" leading to plaintiff's injury. 
Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246 & n.19; Williams, 699 P.2d at 726 
(plaintiff's burden to show it was a "proximate" cause, as well as 
"actual" cause); see also Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1083; Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 431, comment a (1965) (not enough that the harm 
would not have occurred if the actor had not been negligent); 
Carlotta v. Warner, 601 F. Supp. 749, 752-53 (E.D. Ky. 1985) (even 
in comparative negligence jurisdiction, plaintiff must show 
defendant's negligent act or omission was a substantial factor in 
causing plaintiff's harm); Sharp v. North Star Borough, 569 P.2d 
178, 181 (Alaska 1977) (negligent conduct may be proximate cause of 
injury only if, more likely than not, it was a substantial factor 
in bringing it about).19 
19See also Utah State Bar Litigation Section, Model Utah Jury 
Instructions § 3.12 (Draft April 15, 1991): 
In addition to deciding whether the defendant was 
negligent, you must decide if that negligence was a 
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The Restatement's "substantial factor" formulation of 
proximate, or legal, causation as a limit on legal responsibility 
was embraced by this court in Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 
P.2d 1047, 1051 (1952); accord Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 
417 P.2d 664, 667 (1966). See also Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246; 
Badger v. Clavson, 18 Utah 2d 329, 4222 P.2d 665, 666 (1967) 
(approving an instruction that a driver's unreasonable failure to 
keep a lookout would incur liability if it "proximately contributed 
in any substantial degree to cause the collision[.]"); Devine v. 
Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073, 1080 (1955)- It is currently 
set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965), which 
provides: "The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm 
to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm . . . ." Here, the word "substantial" 
is used to denote the fact that defendant's conduct has 
such an effect in producing the harm as to lead 
reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word 
in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the 
idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called 
"philosophic sense," which includes every one of the 
great number of events without which any happening would 
not have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in 
the so-called "philosophic" sense, yet the effect of many 
of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would 
think of them as causes. 
"proximate cause" of the plaintiff's injuries. 
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a 
cause and effect relationship between the negligence and 
plaintiff's injury. But cause and effect alone is not 
enough. For injuries to be proximately caused by 
negligence, two factors must be present: 
First, the negligence must have played a substantial 
role in causing the injuries; and 
Second, a reasonable person could foresee that the 
injury could result from the negligent behavior. 
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.Id., comment a. The considerations that are, alone and in 
combination, important in determining whether a defendant's 
negligence constitutes a substantial factor are 
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in 
producing the harm and the extent of the effect which 
they have in producing it; 
(b) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or 
series of forces which are in continuous and active 
operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a 
situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for 
which the actor is not responsible; 
(c) lapse of time. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965). 
In Carlotta, 601 F. Supp. at 752-54, the court applied the 
substantial factor test in a case involving a plaintiff tenant 
injured diving onto an inner tube he had put into an apartment 
complex swimming pool in violation of the defendant complex owner's 
regulations. The court concluded as a matter of law that, even if 
the defendant was negligent in failing to enforce those 
regulations—an omission that would undeniably be a cause-in-fact 
of the accident—plaintiff's active negligence in encountering and 
creating the very risk that caused his injury prevented the 
defendant's slight and passive negligence from being a substantial 
factor in bringing about the accident. Notwithstanding the fact 
that Kentucky is a comparative negligence state, defendant was 
granted summary judgment because plaintiff was held to be the sole 
proximate cause of his own injuries. See District of Columbia v. 
Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 716-17 (D.C. App. 1984) (no jury could 
reasonably conclude that a municipality's negligent failure to 
erect a downed sign warning of a crosswalk 200' ahead was 
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substantial cause of injuries incurred by pedestrian in crosswalk 
of which defendant driver was actually aware); Munson v, State 
Dep't of Highways, 531 P.2d 1174 (Idaho 1975) (applying substantial 
factor test and holding that repair crew's failure to erect signs 
warning of blocked construction zone could not reasonably be found 
a legal cause of fatal injuries incurred when driver observed 
clearly visible repair crew and equipment ahead in lane but 
nonetheless rearended pickup stopped by crew's flagger); see also 
Reidling v. Wickes Lumber & Building Supply Co., 471 S.W.2d 319, 
321 (Ky. 1971) (downed stop sign not proximate cause of crash 
because driver had statutory duty to stop even in absence of sign); 
Atkinson v. County of Oneida, 59 N.Y.2d 840, 464 N.Y.S.2d 747, 451 
N.E.2d 494, 495 (1983) (failure to install additional warning 
lights and advisory speed sign not proximate cause of crash because 
drivers familiar with intersection). 
In this case, UDOT was found negligent because its traffic 
control plan for this resurfacing project did not require the 
contractor either to use more warning signs or to make it 
physically impossible for two drivers moving too fast for the loose 
gravel conditions to be abreast of each other in the two southbound 
lanes from milemarker 136 to 134. The plan did, however, require 
numerous signs warning of the loose gravel and resurfacing activity 
in the area, regulatory "DO NOT PASS" signs every mile, and 
advisory 25 mph speed limits signs (Ex. 10, Addendum Item B). 
Onto this stage set move three other negligent actors. At the 
time plaintiff reached the project site, there is some evidence 
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that LeGrand failed to implement fully UDOT's approved traffic 
control plan. Nonetheless, McCorvey and Wright drove over eight 
miles of newly resurfaced highway—past the numerous warning signs 
that were in place—before reaching the rolled but unswept section 
of the outside lane at about milemarker 136 (see photos of entire 
project site included as Item J in separate Addendum). They were 
indisputably aware, even before that point, that they were each in 
a loose gravel resurfacing project, a highway condition that 
required them to slow down even in the absence of regulatory speed 
limit or warning signs requiring them to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-46 (1970) (driver's duty to drive at speed reasonable in light 
of existing hazards on road, actual and potential). Instead, 
Wright travels south toward milemarker 136 at speeds up to 75 mph, 
illegally passing Taylor on the left shoulder and then Villareal on 
the right. Both Wright and McCorvey went downhill from milemarker 
136 for over a mile at speeds too fast for obviously impaired 
conditions and at or in excess of the 55 mph regulatory speed limit 
signs, past a flagger, resurfacing equipment and a crew at the Cove 
Fort overpass at milemarker 135, and then tried to illegally pass 
each other in a dangerous, macho game of chicken. In a foolish 
attempt to beat out Wright, even though he was aware of the loose 
gravel in both lanes and was driving a small lightweight sports 
car, McCorvey accelerated even more, to 60-65 mph, instead of 
merely taking his foot off the gas to slow down and drop back and 
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away from Wright.20 
At this point, these three active forces encounter another set 
in motion by the contractor, which left mounds of thick loose 
gravel in the swept, outside left lane. At the very moment 
McCorvey accelerates to win their race, his small car gets caught 
in some deep excess gravel left by the contractor in the left lane 
that sends him out of control and off the highway. Once in the 
median, instead of slowing down, McCorvey again foolishly tries to 
get back onto the roadway by steering hard to the right, sending 
the Honda into a disastrous roll that ejects him and his passenger. 
These five factors other than the traffic control plan 
immediately and substantially contributed to the harm suffered by 
McCorvey: LeGrand's failure to have in place all the signs required 
by the traffic control plan; McCorveyfs speeding and illegal 
passing in disregard of warnings in place and observed conditions 
and failure to slow down when challenged by Wright; Wright's 
speeding and illegal passing on the right side in a no passing zone 
in disregard of posted warnings and observed conditions; LeGrand's 
failure to remove clumps of loose gravel from the left lane; and 
McCorvey's turn once in the median. The combined effects of these 
contributing factors were so predominant in producing the harm to 
McCorvey as to render the effect of UDOT's prior negligence in 
adopting the traffic control plan minimal and insignificant in 
comparison, preventing the latter from being a substantial 
20If McCorvey had touched his brakes for only 7/10ths of a 
second he could have separated himself 50' from another vehicle 
(Transcript of November 20, 1990 at 83). 
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causative factor. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(a), 
comment d. No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. 
The same conclusion is compelled if one examines the situation 
created by UDOT's traffic control plan, as directed by Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 433(b) (1965). That plan permitted traffic in 
both southbound lanes at up to 55 mph, but required a "DO NOT PASS" 
sign every mile throughout the project. Observant, law-abiding 
drivers travelling up to 55 mph from milemarker 136 to 134, keeping 
a safe, lawful distance behind the car ahead and not passing 
another car, could maneuver through the loose resurfacing material 
in either lane without losing control of their cars. Two thousand 
cars per day actually managed to do so on this resurfaced stretch 
of 1-15. 
There will always be some risk of harm whenever a highway is 
resurfaced with the chip seal process. Even if the traffic control 
plan omissions created a greater risk of harm by allowing cars onto 
the outside, unswept lane at normal traffic speeds, the risk of 
physical harm to drivers evading gravel thrown from that outside 
(right) lane was still, at most, a remote potential risk. The 
actual risk created by UDOT's traffic control plan was one of harm 
to windshields and paint jobs if drivers did not obey the numerous 
"DO NOT PASS" signs and warning signs the plan did require and heed 
apparent road conditions by slowing down. The situation created by 
the traffic control plan was essentially harmless to McCorvey's 
physical wellbeing unless and until acted upon by the other 
causative forces that created an actual, likely risk of personal 
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injury. See Restatement § 441(1), comment b. There was some 
evidence not all of the required warning signs were in place. Then 
two illegally passing drivers who are, or should be, aware that 
they are in a chip resealing zone nonetheless jockey to get ahead 
of each other while kicking up loose gravel at illegal high speeds. 
They set in motion forces that then combined with the most 
predominant force, i.e., thick gravel left upon the left lane by a 
negligent contractor, and then with another causative force exerted 
by McCorvey when he tried to return to the highway instead of 
slowing down in the median. 
Whether the predominant effects of the numerous other 
contributing factors are considered by themselves or together with 
the harmlessness of the situation created by the traffic control 
plan, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that defects in the 
traffic control plan had anything but an insignificant effect in 
producing harm to McCorvey. Because there is insufficient evidence 
that UDOT's omissions were a substantial factor in bringing about 
that harm, this Court should determine as a matter of law that 
UDOT's negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury 
and accordingly reverse the judgment against UDOT. 
B. Even if omissions from the traffic control 
plan were a substantial factorr the subsequent 
negligent conduct of LeGrand alone or the 
subsequent, concurring negligent conduct of 
McCorvey and Wright, which were legally 
unforeseeable, intervened and became the 
superseding proximate cause of the harm# thus 
relieving UDOT of legal responsibility. 
Like the "substantial factor" test discussed above, the law of 
superseding causation essentially involves a policy question of the 
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extent of the defendant's legal responsibility and not just 
"causation," since the issue does not arise until cause-in-fact is 
established. Prosser § 44, at 301; see Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1083. 
An actor whose negligent conduct is a substantial factor in 
bringing about harm is nonetheless relieved from legal 
responsibility by a superseding cause that is an intervening force, 
whether it is the act of a third person or another force. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440 (1965). Considerations 
important in determining whether an intervening force is a 
superseding cause of harm are set forth in Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 442 (1965): 
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm 
different in kind from that which would otherwise have 
resulted from the actor's negligence; 
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences 
thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather 
than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the 
time of its operation; 
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating 
independently of any situation created by the actor's 
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal 
result of such a situation; 
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening 
force is due to a third person's act or to his failure to 
act; 
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an 
act of a third person which is wrongful toward the other 
and as such subjects the third person to liability to 
him; 
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of 
a third person which sets the intervening force in 
motion. 
If the subsequent intervening force is negligent conduct, it does 
not constitute a superseding cause of the harm incurred if the 
intervening negligence was foreseeable by the earlier actor at the 
time of the earlier actor's conduct. Godeskv, 690 P.2d at 545; 
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Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1983); 
Jensen v. Mountain States Tel & Tel, Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980). 
In Jensen, the court adopted this foreseeability rule from 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447 (1965) [hereinafter 
"Restatement"]: 
The fact that an intervening act of a third person 
is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner 
does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another 
which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about, if 
(a) the actor at the time of his negligence should 
have realized that a third person might so act, or 
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing 
when the act of the third person was done would not 
regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person 
had so acted, or 
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of 
a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner 
in which it is done is not extraordinarily 
negligent. [21] 
Stated another way, foreseeable intervening causes of harm, even if 
they are negligent conduct, are within the scope of the original 
risk, and hence of the antecedent actor's negligence. Prosser § 44 
at 303. Thus, "the standard of reasonable conduct may require the 
defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional] 
negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life and 
therefore to be anticipated.'" Harris, 671 P.2d at 219 (quoting 
Prosser, The Law of Torts § 44, at 274, now Prosser § 44, at 304). 
There are two alternative grounds for concluding that UDOT's 
legal responsibility in this case is cut off by a superseding 
cause. The first consists of the intervening act of the third 
21The rule in this section applies to intervening negligent 
acts by the injured person or a third person. Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 447, comment h (1965). 
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party, LeGrand, in failing to properly roll and sweep the inside 
(left) lane to eliminate the mounds of loose gravel that eventually 
sent McCorvey off the highway out of control. 
This subsequent intervening force by a third person was the 
most critical contributing cause in the sense that the presence of 
thick patches of excess loose gravel at the edge of the inside lane 
created a high likelihood of physical harm to drivers there— 
particularly those in smallf lightweight cars—because it created 
an actual risk that they would, even if travelling at speeds 
reasonable in light of the loose gravel that was apparent in that 
southbound lane for several miles, lose control of their vehicles. 
See Restatement § 442(d). McCorvey and Wright could have even 
played their high-speed game and the Honda could have nonetheless 
maneuvered to the end of the project site without leaving the 
highway if McCorvey's last acceleration had not concurred precisely 
in time and space with the patch of thick gravel LeGrand left in 
the roadway. LeGrand's active conduct, which was totally 
independent from (not a consequence of) the passively harmless 
situation created by omissions from the traffic control plan, thus 
brought about physical harm drastically different in kind from the 
harm that otherwise was reasonably likely to result from the 
negligent omissions from the traffic control plan. See Restatement 
§ 442(a), (c), 447(c); see also Restatement § 441(1), comment b.22 
22If this issue were analyzed in terms of duty/risk, UDOT would 
argue that it should not be held liable because the harm that 
occurred was not of the same general nature as that specifically 
risked by its negligence. See Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 325 
A.2d 270, 273 (1973); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B (1965). 
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In light of the high probability of some serious physical harm 
resulting from leaving thick loose gravel in a lane where heavy 
traffic is moving at 55 mph, this conduct by LeGrand can only be 
viewed as extreme negligence involving a relatively high degree of 
culpability, just as the jury found. See Restatement §§ 442(f), 
447(c), Looking back on this accident, this shocking omission by 
LeGrand, an experienced chip seal resurfacing contractor, is so 
extraordinary that UDOT could not reasonably have foreseen, when it 
adopted the traffic control plan allowing traffic into the outside, 
unswept lane at speeds up to 55 mph, that LeGrand would so act. 
Given the evidence on these relevant considerations, no jury 
acting reasonably and fairly could have concluded that LeGrand was 
not the superseding cause of injury to McCorvey. This Court should 
so hold and reverse the portion of the judgment against UDOT 
accordingly. 
Even if the court determines that LeGrand's conduct in leaving 
thick patches of excess gravel in the roadway was, though 
negligent, legally foreseeable to UDOT and thus not a superseding 
cause, there is another ground for concluding that UDOT's legal 
responsibility to McCorvey is nonetheless terminated by a 
superseding cause. This second superseding cause consists of the 
concurring, intervening conduct of McCorvey and Wright that the 
jury found proximately caused McCorvey's injuries. 
Under the duty/risk method of analysis, "[t]he issue for the court 
is whether the risk to which the plaintiff has been subjected is 
within the scope of defendant's duty." Thode, supra note 16 at 26. 
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These subsequently concurring proximate causes of this 
accident, which together form an intervening force as defined in 
Restatement § 441, drastically augmented the actual risk of 
physical harm first created by LeGrand and actually brought about 
harm different in kind from that which would have otherwise 
resulted only from any antecedent negligent omissions from UDOT's 
traffic control plan. See Restatement §§ 442(a), 442B. As 
discussed above, UDOT's traffic control plan did not, standing 
alone, create a legal injury. See id. at § 442(c), comment d. At 
most, it created a passive situation that was harmless until acted 
upon by this new active, intervening force; the situation was only 
a potentially dangerous one capable of being made injurious by 
drivers not only going too fast in light of the obvious hazards, 
but also disobeying posted speed limits and "DO NOT PASS" signs to 
compete in a road race. See Restatement § 441(1), comment b. The 
intervening force—composed of these actions by McCorvey and 
Wright—was "independent" in the Restatement sense in that it was 
not a normal result of the situation created by UDOT's passive 
negligence. See Merz v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 53 Wis.2d 47, 191 
N.W.2d 876, 881 (1971) (intervening act of cab driver who backed 
wrong way down one way street was superseding cause of injury to 
person he collided with, because act was abnormal reaction to 
street blockage by negligent defendant's truck). The engagement in 
a road race through a known and obviously hazardous loose gravel 
zone, at speeds in excess of the posted legal limit and in excess 
of what apparent road conditions demanded, was not conceivably a 
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"normal" response to the fact that both of these newly resurfaced 
lanes were open, the regulatory speed limit was 55 mph, and the 
recommended speed limit was 25 mph. The unreasonable (i.e., 
negligent) character of the acts by McCorvey and Wright only 
buttresses the inescapable conclusion that they comprised an 
"abnormal" intervening force in the sense contemplated by the 
Restatement rules for determining the extent of an actor's 
liability. See Restatement §§ 443, comment c, 447, comment c.23 
Thus, any antecedent negligence by UDOT did not influence the 
intervening force. See Restatement §§ 442(b)-(d), 443 and comment 
a. 
In hindsight, the operation of these subsequent causative 
factors as an intervening force bringing about physical harm can 
only be deemed extraordinary in light of the circumstances existing 
at the time of intervention. See id. at § 442(b), 443, comment b; 
see also Stratioti v. Bick, 704 F.2d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(defendant's negligence not legal cause of injury if appellate 
court, looking back from harm to negligent conduct, concludes it is 
highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm 
because the intervening force was an unforeseeable event); Allen v. 
Shiroma, 266 Or. 567, 514 P.2d 545, 548 (1973) (defendant not 
"intervening conduct that is negligent may nevertheless be 
"normal" under the Restatement formulation. Here, an intervening 
act or collection of acts is an "abnormal" consequence of (or 
reaction to) the situation created by UDOT if this Court—looking 
at the matter in retrospect and knowing the situation existing when 
the intervening conduct occurred—would regard it as extraordinary 
that such an act, regardless of its unreasonableness, was done. 
See Restatement § 447, comment c. 
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liable to injured plaintiff where he could not have foreseen the 
highly extraordinary intervening chain of causative events). UDOT 
could not reasonably have foreseen at the time of adopting its 
traffic control plan that McCorvey and Wright would act abnormally 
and in this extraordinarily negligent manner to turn the situation, 
i.e., the unswept outside lane open to 55 mph traffic, into an 
injurious one. UDOT could not and should not have foreseen any 
reasonable likelihood of such conduct constituting an intervening 
force since it is not one of the "ordinary incidents of human life" 
that UDOT should reasonably have anticipated. See Harris, 671 P.2d 
at 219; Restatement § 447(a)-(c) and comments a, b, and e. 
Finally, notwithstanding the jury's low assignment of 
proportionate fault to McCorvey, challenged below in Point II, the 
evidence presented at trial, when viewed in a light most favorable 
to the jury's special verdict finding that McCorvey was negligent 
as claimed, clearly demonstrates that his voluntary conduct in 
racing through a known road hazard at high speeds was extremely 
culpable. See Restatement §§ 442(f), 447(c). 
For these reasons, no reasonable jury could conclude that this 
subsequent intervening force, consisting of the high-speed road 
race through this resurfacing project, was not a superseding cause 
of harm to McCorvey. This Court should hold therefore that the 
evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the finding 
that UDOT's negligence was a proximate cause of his injury and, 
accordingly, reverse the portion of the judgment against UDOT. 
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II. VIEWING ALL THE EVIDENCE IN A LIGHT FAVORABLE 
TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT FINDING McCORVEY 
NEGLIGENT, NO JURY COULD FAIRLY AND REASONABLY 
FIND THAT UDOT'S FAILURE TO ADOPT A TRAFFIC 
CONTROL PLAN MAKING A HIGH-SPEED, SIDE-BY-SIDE 
ROAD RACE IMPOSSIBLE WAS MORE CULPABLE THAN 
McCORVEY'S VOLUNTARY ENGAGEMENT IN ONE DESPITE 
THE KNOWN, APPARENT HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS. 
In its special verdict, the jury found both McCorvey and UDOT 
to be negligent in one or more of the ways claimed and, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1992),24 found that their respective 
percentages of fault were: McCorvey 10% and UDOT 28% (R. 02521-
23). By finding McCorvey negligent, the jury accepted UDOT's claim 
that McCorvey had unreasonably sped through this chip seal 
resurfacing project—mimicking a flagger trying to get him to slow 
down, and ignoring warning signs and regulatory speed limit and "DO 
NOT PASS" signs, as well as the loose gravel he saw in both lanes— 
before racing with Wright and moving too far to the left into loose 
gravel on the highway shoulder. No jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could have then gone on to assess more fault against 
UDOT than against McCorvey himself. In making this argument, UDOT 
is acutely aware of this Court's reluctance to interfere in the 
factfinder's allocation of relative fault. Nonetheless, this case 
presents one of those rare instances in which the Court must 
intervene to set aside an apportionment of fault that is completely 
contrary to the evidence and to the jury's own explicit and 
24The statute provides: "The trial court may, and when 
requested by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find 
separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages 
sustained and the percentage of proportion of fault attributable to 
each person seeking recovery and to each defendant." 
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implicit factual findings concerning the parties' actions. See, 
e.g. , Garrett Freiahtlines v. Bannock Paving Co,, 121 Idaho 722, 75 
P.2d 1033 (1987) (setting aside jury finding of equal fault by 
negligent driver and negligent chip seal contractor). 
During this November 1990 trial, the jury saw a very 
sympathetic plaintiff, a meek, pathetic young man who faces a life 
of pain, incontinency, and severe physical limitations. Yet on the 
afternoon of August 7, 1986, Daniel McCorvey engaged in reckless 
conduct through this highway repair project that put his own life 
and his passenger's life at risk, acting like a bold, thrill-
seeking teenaged boy who has not yet glimpsed mortality. He would 
not back off when challenged for the lead by Wright in his big van, 
though all he had to do was lift his foot from the gas pedal. 
Instead, he angrily took on Wright's challenge and challenged 
Wright back, daring to go even faster under dangerous conditions. 
But McCorvey lost this dare, and he lost big, when he moved off the 
normal lane of travel into gravel on the inside highway shoulder. 
The jurors understood that McCorvey acted unreasonably under 
the circumstances he faced. They rejected his story that he didn't 
know what to do, that he was surprised by loose gravel in his lane 
and trapped by gravel thrown from the van next to him. They 
rejected his claim that he didn't know better when he tried to 
accelerate past Wright and lost control. Nonetheless, it concluded 
that the State highway department's conduct was more culpable, more 
blameworthy, than McCorvey's. Why? Because UDOT did not close 
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down the unswept outside lane and make it physically impossible for 
McCorvey and Wright to risk life and limb in their high-speed drag 
race south of milemarker 136• 
The message from the jury's fault attribution is that 
daredevils and risk takers
 f including reckless or grossly negligent 
highway drivers, are merely victims when they get injured; they no 
longer need to take moral or legal responsibility for the 
consequences of their own voluntary acts.25 Insteadf the State 
should take the blame because it did not prevent bad drivers from 
recklessly risking their lives speeding under obviously adverse 
highway repair conditions. This is exactly what plaintiff argued 
to the jurors just before they deliberated. According to McCorvey, 
UDOT had a duty that was "superior" to his duty to drive in a safe 
and legal manner, i.e., UDOT's duty was to force him and Wright not 
to race here by adopting a traffic control plan that closed the 
outside right lane and confined them to only one lane of travel (R. 
3008 at 50, 51, 54, 56, 63). In plaintiff's counsel's words, "We 
can't allow the motorists to act for themselves. We have to tell 
them what to do and where to go and how to do it, because we are 
protecting them from themselves and others." (R. 3008 at 54). 
UDOT has no such superior duty to make negligent driving, in 
all of its possible forms, physically impossible. Roads kill; 
25This view is perhaps reflective of a national trend in tort 
litigation rewarding parties who refuse individual responsibility 
and instead blame others for the results of their own mistakes, a 
cultural change criticized recently in the popular press, e.g., 
Morrow, "A Nation of Finger Pointers," Time, Aug. 12, 1991, at 14. 
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speeding kills. How could UDOT could carry out such a duty, except 
by using pilot cars and speed bumps on every mile of Utah's highway 
system to insure that no one drives too fast for conditions? Those 
conditions vary continuously, depending on road surface and weather 
and on the responsive conduct of all drivers at any given moment. 
In short, it is an impossible burden for the State, and its 
citizens, to accept greater blame than dangerous drivers themselves 
and, with it, financial responsibility for the life threatening, 
voluntary acts of every extraordinarily negligent driver on our 
highways. 
This Court, in setting aside the jury's finding of more fault 
by UDOT than McCorvey, should do what the jury, looking at this 
unfortunate man every day of this long trial, apparently could not 
bring itself to do: Tell Daniel McCorvey that he not only made 
serious mistakes and acted unreasonably, but that when the 
culpability of his conduct is compared to that of UDOT's conduct, 
he must shoulder more blame. If he is a victim at all, he is 
primarily a victim of his own bad judgments and daredevil illusions 
of invulnerability. 
III. IT IS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO GIVE A "SUDDEN 
PERIL" JURY INSTRUCTION UNDER UTAH'S 
COMPARATIVE FAULT SYSTEM, IN WHICH THE JURY 
DETERMINES ALL ACTORS' NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE 
SAME STANDARD, I.E., WHETHER THEIR CONDUCT WAS 
REASONABLE UNDER ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND 
ALSO DETERMINES THEIR RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF 
FAULT. ALTERNATIVELY, IT WAS PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN THIS CASE TO GIVE INSTRUCTION 33 IN 
LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED. THE TRIAL 
COURT THUS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
UDOT A NEW TRIAL ON THIS BASIS. 
Over defendants' objections (Unnumbered Transcript of November 
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[2]1, 1990, at 13, 18), the jury was instructed that 
[a] person who is suddenly and unexpectedly 
confronted with a peril arising from either the actual 
presence or the appearance of imminent danger to himself 
or to others is not expected nor [sic] required to use 
the same judgment and prudence as required of him in 
calmer and more deliberate moments. His duty is to 
exercise only the care which an ordinary prudent person 
would exercise in the same situation. If at the moment 
he does what appears to him to be the best thing to do, 
and if his choice and manner of action are the same as 
might have been followed by any ordinary prudent person 
under the same conditions, he does all the law requires 
of him, although in light of after events, it should 
appear that a different course would have been better and 
safer. 
However, the presence of such an emergency or sudden 
peril does not constitute such an excuse or justification 
for negligence if the emergency or sudden peril was 
caused by that driver's own fault. 
(R. 02562—Jury Instruction 33, Addendum Item L). UDOT's motion 
for a new trial based on error in giving Instruction 33 (R. 02733; 
R. 02701; Unnumbered Transcript of January 7, 1991, at 25) was 
denied by the trial court (Transcript of January 7, 1991 at 37). 
A. A jury instruction on the "sudden peril" 
doctrine is improper under Utah's statutory 
comparative fault scheme because it (1) 
erroneously implies normal standards of proof 
and principles for determining negligence are 
inapplicable to the actor claiming its 
protections; (2) unfairly emphasizes the 
evidence of that actor; and (3) improperly 
tends to excuse the negligence of, and thereby 
reduce the fault of, that actor in the minds 
of jurors determining relative degrees of 
fault of all actors• 
No Utah appellate court has yet addressed the appropriateness 
of any sudden peril instruction to facts arising after the 1986 
enactment of section 78-27-39, which adopted a comparative fault 
approach to apportionment of liability among multiple parties. 
Likewise, the issue of whether the sudden peril doctrine should 
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ever be instructed upon separately from the law that a person is 
required to exercise due care under all the circumstances is one of 
first impression in this jurisdiction• 
However, Utah appellate courts have already held that other 
tort doctrines, which similarly evolved under the harsh all-or-
nothing contributory negligence system, were expressly or 
implicitly abolished by the Utah Legislature's abandonment of 
contributory negligence nearly twenty years ago. In Jacobsen 
Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980), 
the jury specially found that plaintiff had assumed a known risk by 
using a defectively manufactured storage tank, but found the 
relative negligence of plaintiff and defendant manufacturer to be 
20% and 70%, respectively.26 Noting that section § 78-27-37 then 
expressly defined a plaintiff's possible negligence as including 
"assumption of the risk," this Court rejected the argument that the 
jury's assumption of risk finding should result in a complete bar 
to its recovery from defendant. The Court held that the doctrine 
had been abolished by the legislature's 1973 adoption of a 
comparative negligence system, in which even a negligent plaintiff 
may recover if his or her negligence is less than defendant's. Id. 
at 309. The Court agreed that this "defendant's doctrine" 
26Until 1986, Utah's Comparative Negligence Act required the 
factfinder to apportion the amount of any negligence attributable 
to the plaintiff in proportion to the amount of any negligence 
attributable to the person(s) from whom recovery was sought. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1977) (repealed by 1986 Utah Laws ch. 1989, 
§ 1, effective April 28, 1986). Since the adoption then of the 
Liability Reform Act, however, the factfinder determines the 
relative proportions of fault of all the actors, not of their 
negligence. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to -39 (1992). 
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restricting liability is confusing and duplicative of the concepts 
of duty and negligence generally. Id.. Utah thus joined numerous 
other jurisdictions in treating the plaintiff's conduct in the face 
of a known risk as subsumed by the question of whether he or she 
was negligent under all the circumstances. Id.; see Stephens v. 
Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1987) (in light of Jacobsen, 
defendant not entitled to instruction that plaintiff would be 
negligent if she assumed the risk of a dangerous condition). More 
recently, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the "open and obvious 
danger" doctrine, which is found essentially indistinguishable from 
the "assumption of the risk" doctrine, was likewise extinguished by 
the legislature's rejection of contributory negligence and its 
adoption, in present section 78-27-37(2), of a system in which the 
factfinder is to allocate liability for an injury based on its 
apportionment of the parties' relative fault. Donahue v. Durfee, 
780 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Utah App. 1989). This conclusion was based in 
part on the statutory definition of "fault" under Utah's 
comparative fault system as "any actionable breach of legal duty, 
act, or omission . . . including, but not limited to, negligence in 
all its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2) (1992). 
Two years after Jacobsen, this Court held that the "last clear 
chance" doctrine, a "plaintiff's doctrine" under an all-or-nothing 
contributory negligence system, was likewise extinguished by the 
1973 adoption of a comparative negligence system. Dixon v. 
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 599 (Utah 1982). Finding no error in the 
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trial court's refusal to give plaintiff's "last clear chance" jury 
instruction, this Court concluded that the doctrine is subsumed 
within comparative negligence; thus, whether the defendant had the 
last clear chance to avoid injury to plaintiff is just one of the 
many factors to be weighed in the factfinder's comparison of 
negligence required under former section 78-27-38. Id. at 598 n.7. 
The sudden peril instruction is also a "plaintiff's doctrine" 
that developed under the traditional contributory negligence system 
to soften the harsh and inflexible result of total victory or 
unconditional defeat compelled by that system. Like the last clear 
chance doctrine favorable to plaintiffs that was done away with in 
Dixon, the reasons for the sudden peril doctrine were extinguished 
when the legislature abandoned the old contributory negligence 
system. This Court should likewise hold that whether a plaintiff 
was faced with a sudden peril excusing his or her conduct is 
subsumed into the factfinder's evaluation of whether plaintiff 
exercised due care under all the circumstances. In other words, 
the existence of a sudden peril and plaintiff's response to it 
should be just two factors among many that weigh into the 
determination of whether the plaintiff's conduct was negligent and 
what proportion of relative fault is attributable to that conduct. 
A sudden peril instruction adds nothing necessary to 
established law applicable to assess the reasonableness of an 
actor's conduct, i.e., did he or she exercise due care under all 
the circumstances, the standard for assessing negligence given to 
the jury in Instructions 21-23. On the contrary, the giving of a 
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separate sudden peril instruction confusingly suggests that 
different principles, including a higher standard of proof, apply 
in assessing the reasonableness of the conduct of the actor 
claiming to have reacted to an emergency. It also unfairly 
emphasizes evidence favorable to the party seeking its benefits. 
For these reasons, the sudden peril instruction has been banned in 
Mississippi, a pure comparative negligence state, Knapp v. 
Stanford, 392 So.2d 196, 198 (Miss. 1981), and in Montana, a 
modified comparative negligence state, Simonson v. White, 220 Mont. 
14, 713 P.2d 983, 990 (1986); see also Miller v. Eichhorn, 426 
M.W.2d 641, 644 (Iowa App. 1988) (questioning appropriateness and 
purpose of sudden peril instruction after adoption of modified 
comparative negligence); Templeton v. Smith, 88 Or. App. 266, 744 
P.2d 1325, 1326 (1987) (expressing doubt that it should ever be 
given in an ordinary automobile accident case in modified 
comparative negligence system). See generally H. Woods, 
Comparative Fault §§ 1:11, 4:8 (2d ed. 1987). Furthermore, where 
the factfinder's role is to assess relative proportions of fault 
attributable to multiple parties, as under sections 77-27-37 to -
39, the instruction strongly and unfairly suggests that any 
negligence by plaintiff is excused or justified—and thus less 
culpable—when the jury apportions all actors' relative fault, if 
plaintiff faced a sudden and unexpected peril he or she did not 
cause. 
In light of the superfluous, misleading, and prejudicial 
nature of the sudden peril instruction, UDOT requests this Court to 
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hold that it was reversible error for the trial court to give 
Instruction 33 and, thus, it was an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to deny UDOT's motion for a new trial. 
B. Even if a sudden peril instruction is proper 
in a comparative fault system, it was 
prejudicial error to give it in this case 
because McCorvey was not confronted with any 
sudden emergency that was not the result of 
his own negligent course of conduct. 
Prior to adoption of a comparative fault system, Utah cases 
held it was not error to give a sudden peril instruction if there 
was some evidence to support a party's claim of nonnegligence on 
his or her part in creating any emergency faced. Christiansen v. 
Utah Transit Authority. 649 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah 1982); Hillier v. 
Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 302-03 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277 (1987); see Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172-73 (Utah 
1983); Keller v. Shelley, 551 P.2d 513, 514 (1976). However, a 
sudden peril instruction is improper if the evidence compels the 
conclusion that any emergency encountered was the result of the 
negligent conduct of the person facing it. Redd v. Airway Motor 
Coach Lines, Inc., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347, 378 (1943); see Lee 
v. Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Serv., 606 P.2d 259, 261 (Utah 
1980); Keller, 551 P.2d at 514; Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 
479 P.2d 474, 477 (1971) (the instruction "tends to lead the jury 
to a belief that the Court thought there was a sudden emergency 
presented to a careful driver free from any negligence."). 
Here, the evidence of what took place just before McCorvey 
accelerated out of control compels the conclusion that there either 
was no sudden peril or that, even if there was, it resulted from 
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his own negligence. He had experience driving through numerous 
chip sealing projects and had driven on nine miles of newly 
resurfaced highway through this project, past heavy equipment, a 
repair crew, a flagger, signs warning of loose gravel and 
recommending a 25 mph speed to avoid damage, and eighteen "DO NOT 
PASS" signs. He testified he was having trouble controlling his 
car because of the loose gravel in the left lane from the time he 
passed the Cove Fort interchange at milemarker 135 until he left 
the roadway, approximately 8/10ths of a mile further south. Once 
Wright came up close behind him, he knew that there was gravel 
being thrown up by his own car. He saw that the loo^e gravel in 
the right lane was thick and decided not to pull over there. He 
knew the loose gravel he saw in the right lane made it dangerous 
for Wright to pass him on the right, so he tried to prevent that 
maneuver. When Wright was alongside him, McCorvey knew that gravel 
was being thrown up by the speeding van and he heard the loose 
gravel turned over by the Honda rattling loudly in his own wheel 
wheels. Nonetheless, he continued to race to get ahead of Wright 
and accelerated even more to what his own expert calculated was 60-
65 mph, well in excess of the posted speed limit, before losing 
control in the thick gravel on the shoulder of the left lane. 
If McCorvey was travelling 55 mph from milemarker 135 down to 
the accident site, he would have had approximately 52.3 seconds in 
which to deliberate, evaluate, and take appropriate action and 
decelerate to a reasonable speed to keep his car under control in 
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the loose gravel,27 Even the shorter time it took for Wright to 
pull up alongside the Honda, for Page to shout angrily and make an 
obscene gesture at the van occupants, and then for McCorvey to 
accelerate before moving over into the excess gravel on the inside 
highway shoulder was long enough to disqualify the situation he 
faced from being one of "sudden" peril* See Tansy v. Morgan, 604 
P.2d 626, 628 (Ariz. 1979) (peril not "sudden" since car hit was in 
plain view for sufficient length of time to allow other driver to 
stop); Temple ton, 744 P. 2d at 1326 (reversing a jury verdict for 
defendant based on erroneous giving of sudden peril instruction 
where there was time for any emergency to have been anticipated). 
Thus, it was erroneous to give Instruction 33. 
Even if the Court concludes there was sufficient evidence that 
McCorvey was "suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a sudden 
peril," it was still error to give Instruction 33 in this case. His 
own testimony and that of his experts compels the conclusion that 
any emergency situation he faced while driving in the loose gravel 
was the result of his own negligent conduct in racing through this 
known area of loose gravel, then vying to get ahead of the Wright 
van by accelerating even more, instead of simply taking his foot 
off the gas. In such circumstances, it was erroneous to give 
Instruction 33. See Keller, 551 P.2d at 514; Salt, 479 P.2d at 
477; Redd, 137 P.2d at 138. 
Although the jury proceeded to find that McCorvey was indeed 
27McCorvey, of course, claimed he was going much slower then, 
which would have given him even more time to appreciate his 
situation. 
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negligent/ the trial court's error was nonetheless harmful under 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because Instruction 33 
unduly emphasized evidence favorable to McCorvey's claim that he 
was "trapped." The instruction erroneously describes the existence 
of a sudden peril as "an excuse or justification for negligence/' 
when the gist of the doctrine is that it is not necessarily 
unreasonable, i.e, is not necessarily negligence at all, to make 
an unwise choice in an emergency situation. In this way, the 
instruction strongly suggested that it would be appropriate for the 
jury to find McCorvey less culpable when apportioning fault, even 
though it found him negligent, if a sudden emergency existed as 
"such an excuse or justification for negligence." Furthermore, by 
seating that "the presence of such an emergency or sudden peril 
does not constitute such an excuse or justification for negligence 
if the emergency or sudden peril was caused by that driver's own 
fault," Instruction 33 suggests that any negligence by McCorvey was 
excused or justified, and thus less culpable, if he did not cause 
the emergency, regardless of who or what did. The jury did indeed 
find his conduct less at fault than UDOT's. As discussed above 
under Point II, this allocation of fault is unreasonable and 
unsupported by the evidence, a probable result of the erroneous and 
confusing messages in Instruction 33. 
For these reasons, there is a reasonable likelihood that, 
absent the error in giving this sudden peril instruction, the jury 
would have returned a special verdict more favorable to UDOT on the 
fault apportionment issue by finding it less at fault than 
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McCorvey, leading to no liability under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 
(1992). See Crookston, 817 P.2d at 796-97. Because there is no 
reasonable basis in law or fact for the trial court's denial of 
UDOT's motion for new trial on the basis of this prejudicial error, 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Id. 
at 805. This Court should, therefore, order a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For any one of the alternative bases set out in Points IA, IB 
and II, UDOT respectfully requests this Court to reverse that 
portion of the judgment below entered against it because of the 
legal insufficiency of the evidence of proximate causation or of 
greater proportionate fault by UDOT. If the Court rejects those 
arguments, but agrees under Point III that it was prejudicial error 
for the trial court to give the sudden peril instruction and, 
consequently, that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing UDOT a new trial on this basis, UDOT requests that the 
order denying a new trial be reversed and this case remanded to the 
trial court for that purpose. Submitted this l&U day of March, 
ANNINA M. MITCHELL 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
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